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The Iterative 
Turn
This paper investigates the implications of what I see as the increasingly promi-
nent propensity to copy as a creative practice in contemporary culture. While 
debates about plagiarism, copyright infringement, and the state of copyright 
inform my argument, the focus here is on broader issues. My discussion is 
formulated as an attempt at defining a cultural condition that triggers novel 
attitudes to creativity in order to explore the possibilities of re-conceptualisation 
of copying as a creative category. By doing so, this project strives to interrogate 
the restrictions and inadequacies of the dominant categories of originality, 
creativity, and authorship to propose the notion of iteration as a possible alterna-
tive. Drawing on the example of recent creative projects by child-star cum 
performance artist Shia LaBeouf, practices of copying are represented here as a 
necessary condition of the contemporary culture and a manifestation of a shift 
in aesthetics, here defined as the Iterative Turn. In its attempt to think about the 
contemporary, the paper posits a framework for looking beyond the established 
paradigms of creativity.
Kaja Marczewska is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of Modern and Con-
temporary Culture/Department of English, Linguistics and Cultural Studies 
at the University of Westminster. Her research interests span avant-garde and 
experimental literature and art, hybrid creative-critical forms and innovative 
forms of criticism, digital aesthetics, as well as intersections of the humanities, 
technology, and law. She has published work on questions of unoriginality, 
creativity in the digital context, google surveillance and creative practice, and 
ideas of the curatorial as a creative paradigm.
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AS STEWART HOME PUTS it, “first there were modernists, then there were post-modernists, now there are plagiarists.”1 Although hyperbolic in his attempt at defining changing 
attitudes towards creativity as they emerge in their 
respective cultural moments, in this statement 
Home points to a distinctive aesthetic shift, one, I 
suggest, of increasing prominence today. There is a 
sense here that plagiarism is an aesthetic category 
that has a clearly defined history: Home’s plagiarism 
emerges as historically contingent and following 
on from modernism and postmodernism. But if 
plagiarism can be seen as a natural successor to 
modern and postmodern thought and practice, then, 
by implication, both modernism and postmodern-
ism have to be understood as conditioned upon 
codification of practices related to plagiarism, if 
not plagiarism itself. What Home seems to imply, 
then, is that clear affinities can be drawn between 
dominant models of cultural production in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries and an ongoing 
creative commitment to acts of copying. From 
modernist allusion, through postmodern parody and 
pastiche, to contemporary practices discussed in this 
article, evoked in Home’s trajectory is a sense of a 
characteristic increase in significance of copying for 
creativity that reaches a characteristic tipping point 
today. 
Examples of this move towards creative copying 
in both high and popular contemporary culture 
abound and include Kenneth Goldsmith’s wider 
uncreative project; Vanessa Place’s retweeted Gone 
with the Wind and her retyped legal briefs, recon-
ceptualised as poetry, alongside a range of similar 
publications proliferating among the conceptual 
writing community; Richard Prince and Roger 
Koons’s ongoing commitment to appropriation art; 
the prominence of sampling practices in music; or 
a controversial debut novel by Helene Hegemann, 
published in 2010 in Germany to high critical 
acclaim, but comprising significant amounts of pla-
giarised material. Today, everyone from Baldessari 
to Banksy dabbles in similar forms of copying as an 
expression of creative practice. Whether discussed 
as plagiarist gestures, manifestations of remix or 
appropriation cultures, or what I describe here as 
an expression of the contemporary Iterative Turn, 
the intensifying notoriety of creative practices 
reliant on the possibilities of reusing pre-published 
content posits challenges with respect to categories 
in which to consider them. At the time when on 
the one hand the availability and accessibility of 
information is far greater than ever before, and 
developments in information technologies encourage 
a culture of communal creativity and free appropria-
tion, increased efforts are also being put into place 
to introduce often controversial means of control of 
what has varyingly been described as a democracy 
and an anarchy (recent examples of Stop Online 
Piracy Act [SOPA] in the US and attempts at an 
international ratification of Anti-Counterfighting 
Trade Agreement [ACTA] are a case in point). The 
mounting tensions between the propagators of the 
creative remix culture and the defenders of tradi-
tional copyright law generate contrasting rhetoric of 
tradition versus innovation, stability versus change, 
and print versus digital culture. My discussion here 
is an attempt at exploring this cultural framework 
as a trigger for what I consider an important shift 
in aesthetics. As I argue, creating by means of 
appropriation, borrowing, plagiarism—creating 
by iterative means—finds its particular moment 
in contemporary culture and emerges not as a 
transgressive practice but rather as a characteristic 
attitude towards creativity. My interests here reside 
not in instances of plagiarism or copyright infringe-
ment per se, but rather in the cultural condition 
that triggers the proliferation of acts of copying, a 
condition that affords their re-conceptualisation as 
creative, aesthetic categories. 
Recent controversies surrounding Shia LaBeouf ’s 
attempts at film-making and performance art are 
a useful starting point for thinking about issues 
of creativity and originality as they impinge on 
the contemporary art scene. In December 2013, 
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LaBeouf, a child-star turned performance artist, posted online 
his short film HowardCantour.com, which had debuted at 
the Cannes 2012 festival to high critical acclaim. Its avail-
ability online caused a considerable controversy after signifi-
cant similarities were exposed between LaBeouf ’s film and 
Daniel Clowes’s comic, Justin M. Damiano (2007). The script, 
many of the visuals, as well as dialogues of LaBeouf ’s film 
all proved to be appropriations of Clowes’s, incorporated into 
HowardCantour.com without acknowledgement. On 8 January 
2014 LaBeouf tweeted a storyboard for his next short, Daniel 
Boring. “It’s like Fassbinder meets half-baked Nabokov on 
Gilligan Island” LaBeouf declared.2 The storyboard was, again, 
a copy of a comic series and a graphic novel David Boring 
(2000), also by Daniel Clowes,3 and the statement a quotation 
of Clowes’s description of David.4 LaBeouf circulated his 
Daniel accompanied by a “cease and desist” letter from Clowes’s 
attorney, addressing the issue of both copied works and calling 
LaBeouf to undertake “all appropriate and necessary steps to 
redress his wrongs.”5
While LaBeouf complied with the cease and desist note—
the relevant tweets were deleted, HowardCantour.com taken 
down—his subsequent amends turned into a statement on 
the ambiguous status of the relationship between copies and 
originals in contemporary culture. His public, social-media 
driven apology for an act dismissed by the media as transgres-
sive and infringing took the form of a complete appropriation 
stunt. None of the tweeted statements were LaBeouf ’s own; 
instead his apology for plagiarism was also plagiarised and 
included an eclectic mix of unacknowledged quotations from, 
among others, a hip hop megastar, Kanye West, the notorious 
Toronto Mayor Rob Ford, and Yahoo! website comments 
section.6 LaBeouf ’s explanation of the nature of his art in an 
interview for Bleeding Cool was also a compilation of repurposed 
material: statements by Marcel Duchamp, Kenneth Goldsmith, 
Lawrence Lessig, Gregory Betts, and Steve Jobs, among others. 
It is easy to dismiss LaBeouf ’s transgressions as yet another 
manifestation of the contemporary celebrity art culture 
(Joaquin’s Phoenix’s I’m still Here, James Franco’s various 
artistic endeavours), the role of the social-media information 
machine, “generational aversion to ‘giving credit’”7 fostered 
by habits of sharing information online, and related popular 
culture consumerism. Charges of tastelessness, immorality, 
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and bad art aside, LaBeouf ’s act is nevertheless 
interesting as a characteristic manifestation of 
what I see as a persistent contemporary tendency to 
create by means of copying occurring at an unprec-
edented level in both high and popular culture, 
in mainstream and avant-garde circles alike. It is 
indicative of a very characteristic thinking about 
current means of engaging pre-published content 
as an aesthetic project, unique to the contemporary 
moment. LaBeouf ’s methods resonate, I suggest, 
with echoes of Ted Berrigan’s interview with John 
Cage (1967),8 a text entirely composed by Berrigan 
from a compilation of statements by Warhol and 
Burroughs, among others, but attributing everything 
to Cage. As such, Berrigan’s take on appropriation 
is manifested not only in the act of recycling textual 
material itself, but, perhaps even more importantly, 
in the selection of sources, all pointing to a carefully 
constructed statement on the creative possibility of 
the copy. Berrigan’s act should not be seen as a man-
ifestation of plagiarism. It foregrounds an aesthetic 
engagement with the dynamic of repetition so char-
acteristic of Warhol’s silk screens and Burroughs’ 
cut outs, evoked in Berrigan’s text, and the broader 
attitude it exemplifies. There is a sense of an appro-
priation of not just the source, but of a particular 
attitude to creativity that is repeated when the words 
of Andy Warhol are being flagrantly repurposed. 
LaBeouf ’s plagiarism, I suggest, should be 
considered in similar terms; as an iteration of a 
certain persistent attitude to copying as a creative 
act that finds its manifestation in related forms of 
creative production, a trajectory illustrative of con-
temporary models of creativity. Understood as such, 
the propensity to repeat today should be seen as a 
complete aesthetic project expressed in individual 
works which rely on iterative means as well as on a 
manner in which previous appropriation gestures are 
evoked. LaBeouf ’s preoccupation with Duchamp 
and Goldsmith, and Goldsmith’s commitment to 
engaging with Warhol’s oeuvre both exemplify this 
trajectory. What LaBeouf repeats is not simply a 
specific source text, but the method of appropriation 
itself. His contemporary iterative project surfaces 
as an acknowledgement of the singularity of the 
current cultural moment defined by a drive towards 
acts of re-appropriation of appropriation gestures, of 
repetition of repetition, to arrive at a novel, current 
aesthetic mode. 
Like Berrigan’s, then, LaBeouf ’s sources are sig-
nificant and an expression of his commitment to 
copying as a contemporary avant-garde gesture. 
Echoing Duchamp immediately foregrounds 
LaBeouf ’s interest in the ready-made. His recurring 
references to Lessig and Goldsmith inscribe How-
ardCantour.com, Daniel Boring, and LaBeouf ’s 
apologies into the contemporary framework of 
debates about creativity, authorship, and copyright. 
While drawing from Lessig can be seen as a justi-
fication of LaBeouf ’s acts in legal terms, an interest 
in Goldsmith’s work offers a creative and critical 
point of reference. Promoting ideas of free culture 
and creative commons, and of “an updated notion 
of genius [that centres] around one’s mastery of 
information”,9 both Lessig and Goldsmith respec-
tively move away from thinking about models of 
cultural production in proprietary terms and towards 
paradigms of creativity—“uncreativity”, to borrow 
Kenneth Goldsmith’s term—based on a culture of 
collecting, organising, curating and sharing content. 
For Goldsmith, in the contemporary context, 
practices such as LaBeouf ’s assume a creative quality 
and are a manifestation of characteristic habits of 
textual production and dissemination; “it is not 
plagiarism in the digital age—it’s repurposing”,10 
argues Goldsmith. “It is not plagiarism in the digital 
age—it’s repurposing”11, suggests LaBeouf, without 
acknowledgement. 
This approach, LaBeouf argues, contributes to his 
ongoing creative project as an expression of “meta-
modernist performance art”.12 His two artist’s 
manifestos, positioning his work as meta-modernist 
and intentionally uncreative, are also, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, composed by means of copying, 
repurposing Luke Turner’s meta-modernism 
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manifesto, passed off as LaBeouf ’s,13 and excerpts of Gold-
smith’s Uncreative Writing14 respectively. His recent “Twitter 
as Art” statement is a mash-up, bringing together a selection 
of performance art manifestos by Marilyn Arsem, Scott 
Wichmann and Marina Abramvić, as well as passages copied 
verbatim from Painters Painting, a 1973 documentary. “All art 
is either plagarisum [sic] or revolution”,15 LaBeouf suggests, 
(mis)quoting Paul Gauguin. However, the notion of plagiarism 
today, as acts such as LaBeouf ’s seem to imply, requires a 
radical re-conceptualisation. Where instances of creative 
expression are concerned, “all rights and remedies [might be] 
reserved”16 under the rule of copyright law, as the “cease and 
desist” notice concludes, but LaBeouf ’s stunt seems to imply 
that in the contemporary context their reach, enforceability 
and applicability prove limited. LaBeouf ’s case is a reminder 
that the idea of culture as property is not an unquestion-
able absolute. Rather, as Jonathan Lethem contends, it is “an 
ongoing social negotiation, tenuously forged, endlessly revised, 
and imperfect in its every incarnation.”17 When paradigms of 
information production and dissemination change with the rise 
to prominence of novel media platforms, so does thinking about 
authorship and creativity, a trajectory true both in the context 
of the now familiar, historical, “old” technologies and as a 
manifestation of the contemporary new media cultural trans-
formations. Projects such as LaBeouf ’s contribute to a collective 
attempt at renegotiating the standards that are otherwise taken 
for granted. 
Although removed as a result of the copyright controversy, 
HowardCantour.com and LaBeouf ’s tweets remain accessible 
online. This widespread preservation and availability of the 
material officially deleted posits significant questions about the 
nature of the copy in the digital environment. The dynamic 
of production and dissemination of content online is fore-
grounded here not as a space of the original creation but of 
the inevitable copy, of its persistent proliferation, not only 
independent but, importantly, irrespective of the status of 
the original. The original as a centre and source of meaning, 
in the context, becomes only an illusory centre. This logic of 
the digital copy finds its manifestation in LaBeouf ’s complete 
act. LaBeouf got away with plagiarism, until he did not, his 
transgression identified by a Twitter user almost immediately 
after the release of HowardCantour.com online. If, as Warhol 
(appropriating McLuhan) puts it, art is what you can get away 
8. Berrigan, Ted. An Interview with John Cage. Electronic 
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html (Accessed 2014-09-10).
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(Accessed 2016-04-06). 
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with, then LaBeouf ’s performance is an example of 
how not to do art. But, perhaps, getting away with 
plagiarism is not the point here. Perhaps plagiarism 
in not an appropriate term to describe LaBeouf ’s 
act. His uncreative practice acquires an altogether 
different status if viewed as a clear manifesta-
tion of the influence of the contemporary digital, 
networked culture on the practices of information 
dissemination and artistic expression, on the status 
of the copy. As Goldsmith puts it, “plagiarizing well 
is hard to do”.18 Plagiarising in the social-media 
driven culture proves an impossible feat. In this 
context, questions that need to be raised in relation 
to plagiarism shift away from ethics and towards 
aesthetics of borrowing pre-published content. The 
change in attitude might be a result of increasing 
availability of all published content online and of 
simple, widely accessible tools that make plagiarism 
detection possible. If a “trial by Google”19 enables 
any online user to detect LaBeouf ’s plagiarism 
only a few hours after his work or a statement are 
released online, then the motivations behind acts of 
copying must, inevitably, change. In the context of 
ubiquitous digital media, plagiarism as an attempt 
at passing someone else’s ideas as one’s own ceases 
to be achievable. It is this sense of an impossibility 
of a copy that provokes a proliferation of copies, but 
generated as an expression of transgressive creative 
gestures achieved though inherently uncreative 
acts. Plagiarism seen as such is not antithetical to 
creativity, but rather, as Lethem argues, a necessary 
condition of all writing and creativity, and organi-
cally connected to it.20
There is a certain sense that LaBeouf ’s complete 
work of plagiarism came together as an after-
thought, an attempt at reframing an unambiguous 
instance of plagiarism as a carefully constructed 
performance to avoid the consequences of copyright 
infringement. LaBeouf, by choosing Goldsmith, 
Duchamp or Abramović as his sources, makes a 
stand about the status of his copy as an avant-garde 
project. His self-fashioning as an experimental 
performance artist is a conscious choice to shift 
attention away from the illegality to the aesthetics of 
the act. But this is exactly why LaBeouf ’s case serves 
as a useful example here. It points to the urgency 
and ubiquity of the debates and to the dynamic of 
the environment that generates them. That LaBeouf 
has an extensive knowledge of the history of appro-
priation art is a possibility; that HowardCantour.
com, released two years before the plagiarism con-
troversy started, had been created to incite the 
uncreative performance that followed is likely. 
But there is also a chance that it is the exigency 
of the current debates about open sourcing, file 
sharing, copyright in the digital age, the ubiquity 
of the debates about information dissemination 
and circulation online, and the ease of accessing 
materials about them that collectively enabled a 
construction of LaBeouf ’s defence that was only one 
Google search away, collated as a publicity rather 
than an artist’s statement. And while the approach 
might raise questions about the creative qualities of 
LaBeouf ’s art, the controversy touches at the core 
of the contemporary cultural condition that drives 
the aesthetic developments discussed in this article. 
Acts of plagiarising an artist’s statement, a perfor-
mance piece, plagiarising apologies for plagiarism, 
although dismissed in LaBeouf ’s case as instances 
of copyright infringement and plagiarism by law 
and media respectively, should be seen, I argue, as 
neither. Rather, LaBeouf ’s tenacious copying should 
be considered a manifestation of a condition of 
iteration as an emergent aesthetic attitude. 
Practices of copying today should be considered 
a necessary condition of the current cultural 
moment. While notions of plagiarism, copyright 
infringement, and iteration all imply that forms 
of authorship are defined in relation to a shared 
preoccupation with means of creative production 
informed by acts of copying, the base assump-
tions about the essence of creativity and original-
ity differ significantly where the first two concepts 
and iteration are concerned. Both plagiarism 
and copyright infringement favour originality of 
creation, where originality is synonymous with, 
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simply, not copying. Iteration, on the 
other hand, recognises the creative 
potential of copying. Iteration, as I define 
it here, represents a tendency to repeat 
available material as a creative gesture; 
as an extension rather than a synonym 
of copying and appropriating. While 
copyright infringement and plagiarism 
are preoccupied with questions of 
whether copying has occurred, copying is 
always already implied in iteration. This 
approach is inherent in my use of the 
term, itself an appropriation of Derrida’s 
concept of iterability. According to 
Derrida, the word “iter” means “again”. 
The logic of iterability is the logic of 
repetition. But iterability also inheres 
change. As Derrida explains, the term 
“iter” most likely derives from “itra”, or 
“other” in Sanskrit. Hence, “everything 
that follows can be read as the working 
out of the logic that ties repetition to 
alterity.”21 Repetition is that which, for 
Derrida, alters. The principle of iter-
ability assumes alterity as a condition 
of otherness, difference or change. 
Iterability implies a repetition, but a 
repetition with a différance rather than a 
repetition of the same. Thinking about 
creative practice as iterative necessitates a 
completely new set of questions, which, 
I argue, define contemporary attitudes to 
creativity and the cultural moment that 
breeds them. I describe that moment as 
the Iterative Turn. 
LaBeouf ’s project evokes this new 
iterative attitude. In line with the 
dominant logic, LaBeouf ’s acts are a case 
of a “clear copyright infringement and 
a misappropriation of Daniel Clowes’s 
work.”22 Dismissed as a “blatant copy”, 
and a manifestation of “improper and 
outlandish conduct”, the derivative 
nature of LaBeouf ’s “foolishness” fails 
to comply with the copyright paradigms 
of authorship and originality. Similar 
thinking pervades popular understand-
ing of what it means to create, echoed 
in the media debates about LaBeouf ’s 
plagiarism. While often considered a 
manifestation of an unlawful practice, 
plagiarism is not a legal term. Unlike 
copyright infringement, plagiarism is an 
ethical category. Although inherently 
transgressive, acts of plagiarism do not, 
in all instances, constitute copyright 
infringement. As Laurie Stearns 
explains, 
in some ways the concept of plagiarism 
is broader than infringement, in that 
it can include copying of ideas, or of 
expression not protected by copyright, 
that would not constitute infringe-
ment […] fundamental to both 
plagiarism and copyright infringe-
ment is wrongful copying from a 
preexisiting work. But the form, the 
amount, and the sources of the copying 
prohibited as copyright infringement 
are different from those of the copying 
condemned as plagiarism.23
But, as it is often the case, the logic 
and the media rhetoric of plagiarism 
surrounding LaBeouf ’s performance 
mirror the legal understanding of 
copyright infringement. There is a sense 
that plagiarism is synonymous with a 
failure of a creative process. Plagiarism, 
as Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy 
put it, “is perceived as a problem […]: 
‘using someone else’s words without 
telling whose they are or where you got 
them’; ‘stealing other people’s ideas or 
words.’”24 Plagiarism, then, is considered 
synonymous with theft and the under-
18. Goldsmith, Kenneth. 
Interview by Trace William 
Cowen. Nailed. 2014-01-08. 
http://www.nailedmagazine.
com/interview/interview-
with-kenneth-goldsmith-
by-trace-william-cowen/ 
(Accessed 2014-08-18).
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ity Hunger: A Manifesto. 
London: Hamish Hamilton. 
2010. p. 38.
 
20. Lethem, Jonathan. I’m 
suggesting [originality] is an 
overrated virtue. Interview 
by Harvey Blume. The 
Boston Globe. 2007.03.04. 
http://www.boston.com/
news/globe/ideas/arti-
cles/2007/03/04/qa_jona-
than_lethem/?page=full 
(Accessed 2013-02-24). 
 
21. Derrida, Jacques. 
Signature Event Context. In 
Limited, Inc. Trans. Samuel 
Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman. 
Gerald Graff (ed.). Evanson, 
Il: Northwestern University 
Press. 1988). p. 7. 
 
22. Kump to Wolf.
 
23. Stearns, Laurie. Copy 
Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, 
Property, and the Law. In 
Perspectives on Plagiarism 
and Intellectual Property in 
a Postmodern World. Lise 
Buranen and Alice M. Roy 
(eds.). New York: State Uni-
versity of New York Press. 
1999. p. 9. 
 
24. Buranen, Lise, and Roy, 
Alice M. Introduction to 
Perspectives on Plagiarism and 
Intellectual Property in a Post-
modern World. Lise Buranen 
and Alice M. Roy (eds.). 
New York: State University 
of New York Press. 1999. pp. 
xv-xvi. 
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standing of the notion derives, Marilyn 
Randall explains, from the Latin origins 
of the term, plagium meaning “to kidnap 
a person”, used only with reference 
to children, servants or slaves, people 
who could be considered in proprietary 
terms.25 The same logic translates into 
paradigms of creative production as 
soon as creative outputs are considered 
property, as defined by Intellectual 
Property law. “Once it becomes possible 
to think of literary work as property”, 
Deborah Halbert suggests, “it becomes 
possible to ‘steal’ that property.”26
There is a sense here that a copy is almost 
a taboo. However, my argument stems 
from an assumption that as technolo-
gies and economies of writing change, 
so does the inherent understanding of 
authorship and the dominant attitudes 
towards both creativity and plagiarism. 
We find ourselves now at a transi-
tional cultural stage—at the Iterative 
Turn—characterised by the propensity 
to copy as an expression of creative 
practice. Perhaps, this contemporary 
persistence of acts of copying, of which 
LaBeouf ’s performance is only one 
example, should be seen as a shift, to 
borrow from Marcus Boon, “in relation 
to the forces that constitute that taboo”.27 
If copying emerges as an increasingly 
prominent avenue of creative expression, 
then perhaps the base assumptions of 
creativity need to shift accordingly. The 
critical and creative move towards the 
Iterative Turn I propose here offers one 
possible way of thinking about creativity 
in response to these assumptions. 
Today, the context that triggers iterative 
thinking is digital. As Lev Manovich 
suggests, it is technology, more than 
any critical impulse that should be seen 
as a driving force behind developments 
in modern paradigms of creativity. But 
it is easy to give into techno-deter-
ministic reductionism while focusing 
on technological progress alone. My 
thinking about the logic of iterative 
creative practices is influenced by but 
not limited to the digital environment. I 
am interested in the critical potential of 
technological change and technology’s 
ability to destabilise the familiar cultural 
codes and consider the contemporary 
digital culture as a contextual framework, 
a cultural technique in Bernard Siegert’s 
terms, that exerts significant impact on 
the dynamic of creative practices both 
online and offline. Following Siegert, I 
see new technologies as a characteristic 
“condition of representation”,28 a system 
of reference for paradigms of contem-
porary creativity. This is to say that the 
iterative attitude is not limited to digital 
practices, but it emerges in response to 
the impact of digital culture on cultural 
production broadly conceived. Hence, it 
is the backlash of the Internet copy-paste 
culture of ubiquitous sharing rather than 
that culture itself that forms the context 
for the Iterative Turn, emerging under 
the condition of postproduction and 
not as a straightforward expression of 
mechanism of digital culture. 
Developed by Nicolas Bourriaud, the 
notion of “postproduction” is useful here 
as a critical framework for conceptualis-
ing the state of contemporary creativity. 
While contemporary digital technolo-
gies heavily inform the dynamic of the 
postproduction culture, the technology 
is only one aspect of this much more 
comprehensive cultural ecology and of 
the processes that inform the contempo-
rary aesthetic shift towards iteration. For 
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Bourriaud, postproduction epitomises 
the contemporary, and offers a means 
of presenting “an analysis of today’s art 
in relation to social changes, whether 
technological, economic, or sociologi-
cal.”29 He sees contemporary culture as 
defined by a characteristic sense of excess 
which manifests itself through excessive 
information production, dissemination 
and manipulation characteristic for the 
contemporary digital culture. This under-
standing of the contemporary condition 
serves as a means of distinguishing 
between the contemporary and postmod-
ern moments, the latter characterised 
by extreme consumerism of hyper-
capitalism that triggered appropriation 
art as it developed in the 1970s. This 
characteristic trajectory exemplifies the 
changing nature of appropriation, with 
the aesthetic transformation driven by a 
move away from the overload of things 
to information overload as a defining 
features of creativity today.
The contemporary remix culture 
that Bourriaud poses as a pre-condition 
of the postproduction moment inher-
ently subsumes self-conscious acts of 
appropriation as the dominant creative 
mode of today. “It is no longer a matter 
of elaborating a form on the basis of a 
raw material”, Bourriaud writes, “but 
working with objects that are already in 
circulation on the cultural market, […] 
objects already informed by other objects. 
Notions of originality […] and even 
creation […] are slowly blurred in this 
new cultural landscape.”30 The negotia-
tion of consumption-production dynamic 
implied in Bourriaud’s statement lies at 
the core of his postproduction thinking. 
His postproduction Web is an environ-
ment synonymous with what Christopher 
Schmidt describes as a “waste media 
capitalism”,31 an environment character-
ised by an abundance of language as an 
object of widespread, constant consump-
tion and production online. However, 
the features of material consumed and 
produced online alter the nature of this 
capitalism. In the digital context, tech-
nologies come to be defined in terms of 
processes of reproduction rather than 
production. Within a culture of informa-
tion consumerism, governed by what 
Goldsmith defines as “re-gestures”,32 i.e. 
re-blogging, re-tweeting, the nature of 
information circulation and processing 
presupposes a “scrambling of boundaries 
of consumption and production”.33 This 
is a culture that, as Bourriaud stresses, 
“denies the binary opposition between 
the proposal of the transmitter and the 
participation of the receiver [...] the 
producer is only a transmitter for the 
following producer.”34 As such, any act 
of consumption simultaneously turns 
into an act of production, eradicating, to 
turn to Bourriaud again, “the traditional 
distinction between production and con-
sumption, creation and copy, readymade 
and original work.”35
What transpires, then, is a notion of 
creativity that turns copying into a 
creative paradigm. But copying in the 
postproduction environment assumes a 
hyperbolised structure of reproduction; 
“everything digital is a copy”,36 Carolyn 
Guertin contends. Driven by models of 
digital re-creation, postproduction is 
characterised by proliferation of copies 
of copies, copies without originals.37 
Mark Poster points to a similar feature 
of digital information production. For 
Poster, an act of digital mediation can 
only produce reproductions, not copies of 
originals but rather copies as simulacra, 
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i.e. copies that have no originals. A 
characteristic propensity for the fake 
is implied in this understanding of the 
virtual culture and, as Marie-Laure 
Ryan points out, the term “virtual” itself 
encompasses two distinct concepts: “the 
largely negative idea of a fake, illusion-
ary, non-existent, and the overwhelm-
ingly positive idea of the potential, which 
connotes productivity, openness, and 
diversity.”38 As Ryan explains (quoting 
Pierre Lévy), “the virtual is not at all the 
opposite of the real. It is, on the contrary, 
a powerful productive mode of being, 
a mode that gives free rein to creative 
process.”39 Hence, the derogative culture 
of copying turns into what could be 
described as an aesthetics of plagiarism, 
a different kind of creativity, distinct 
from what we traditionally understand by 
the term, flaunting the convention and 
speculating about the potential of the 
fluidity and the openness of the source. 
Here, the new text remains at the same 
time a deconstructed, displaced old text 
in a new context, linking, to repeat after 
Derrida, repetition to alterity.40 In such 
a cultural frame, iteration becomes a 
cornerstone of creativity. 
This preoccupation with creative possi-
bilities implicit in acts of reusing material 
is, of course, as Bourriaud himself 
admits, “nothing new”.41 The affinities 
of the postmodern and postproduction 
practices are significant. The task of the 
early twenty-first century is in the end, 
as Bourriaud stresses, “not to start from 
zero or find oneself encumbered by the 
store-house of history, but to inventory 
and select, to use and download.”42 As 
such, the contemporary digital impulse 
brings forward new concerns; similar 
forms, similar approaches to uncreative 
practice, already explored at different 
stages of the twentieth century, arise in 
the culture of postproduction through 
an engagement with and in response to 
the new digital hegemony, to address a 
different range of questions, distinct from 
the preoccupations of the postmodern 
predecessors. Today, Fitterman and 
Place argue, “production (industrial 
age) [becomes] replaced by simulation 
(information age).”43 The trajectory 
precludes a particular relationship 
between technology and creativity where 
advancements in reproduction technolo-
gies inevitably result in association of 
creativity with acts of copying. As modes 
of information, (re)production and dis-
semination become more advanced and 
necessary technologies more accessible, 
notions of creativity and copying 
gradually converge to eventually emerge 
as interchangeable terms. As Benjamin 
predicted, in the age of post-mechanical 
reproduction the work of art becomes 
“designed for reproducibility”44 rather 
than for the aura of its manifest singular-
ity. This is not to say that a propensity 
for originality is abandoned when 
increasingly more advanced technologies 
emerge; rather, the attitudes to original-
ity alter as technologies develop. 
Similarly to Bourriaud’s, my reading of 
contemporary reproduction strategies 
in their current technological moment 
is an attempt at identifying a broader 
cultural tendency that emerges under a 
unique, contemporary cultural condition, 
an attitude that I see manifested in 
the emergence of the Iterative Turn. 
As Bourriaud explains, “today certain 
elements and principles are reemerging as 
themes and are suddenly at the forefront, 
to the point of constituting the ‘engine’ 
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of new aesthetic practice.”45 The same 
sense of contemporary culture that relies 
on iterative gestures evoked in Home’s 
trajectory manifests itself clearly in 
Bourriaud’s postproduction thinking. 
The aesthetic paradigms of both Home’s 
plagiarist culture and Bourriaud’s 
postproduction condition presuppose 
a dominance of inherently derivative 
practices, relying on repurposing and 
recycling of the abundance of available 
material proliferating and constantly 
generated online, a dynamic that 
influences habits of cultural production 
and consumption also outside of the 
immediate confines of the Web and 
strictly technology-oriented contexts. 
This is a key assumption, indicative of 
a particular thinking about technology 
that informs the dynamic of the Iterative 
Turn. If contemporary reading and 
writing habits develop as a result of the 
ubiquity of digital environments that 
transform and influence our behaviours 
also outside of the digital sphere, then 
acts of creativity today can be conceived 
of as a manifestation of the Heideg-
gerian “essence of technology” and 
not of the technology itself. This is a 
distinction which informs Heidegger’s 
inquiry in “The Question Concerning 
Technology”—not a question of 
technology per se, but of what Heidegger 
refers to as Wesen, the essence of 
technology: “by no means anything tech-
nological.”46 “Technology”, Heidegger 
explains, “is not equivalent to the essence 
of technology […] the essence of a thing 
is considered to be what the thing is.”47 
In line with Heidegger’s thinking, it 
is the changing understanding of the 
very conception of technology, of what 
technology is, rather than simply of the 
changes in the apparatus of technology 
that should be seen as a trigger for a shift 
in aesthetic attitudes in their respective 
cultural moments. As Žižek puts it, 
the “essence of technology” does not 
designate a complex network of machines 
and activities; rather it is a manifesta-
tion of a particular attitude towards 
reality; “technology”, Žižek comments, 
“is the way reality discloses itself to us 
in contemporary times.”48 Today, then, 
we operate by means of a Heideg-
gerian essence of technology, which, as 
a dominant attitude, “structures the way 
we relate to reality”.49
The problem for Heidegger is not 
the existence of technology—or its 
manifestation in a variety of forms it 
assumes—but rather a propensity for 
and orientation towards technology 
and technological thinking, a certain 
technological imagination that finds its 
manifestations in an aesthetic project. 
The framework within which con-
temporary iterative practices are best 
considered, I suggest, should be based on 
this concept of technology as an essence 
rather than simply viewed as a response 
to changes in technology themselves. Of 
course, the technological developments 
and thinking about technology that 
Heidegger posits are inherently interde-
pendent. It is impossible to speak of the 
essence of technology without consider-
ing technology in instrumental terms, 
while any manifestation of technological 
progress is contingent on the conceptu-
alisation of the essence of technology: 
because the essence of technology 
is nothing technological, essential 
reflection upon technology and decisive 
confrontation with it must happen in 
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a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence 
of technology and, on the other, fundamentally 
different from it.50
“Such a realm”, Heidegger suggests, “is art”.51 In 
order to think about creativity in the contempo-
rary postproduction moment, a model of techno-
logical thinking is required that goes beyond the 
restricted definitions of technology viewed in purely 
instrumental terms. The notion of the essence of 
technology invites a broader, more adaptable and 
comprehensive approach to conceptualising the 
nature and role of technology today. Technology as 
essence cannot be defined as a specific machine or 
a tool, but rather should be seen as a more general 
concept of making, inclusive of processes of artistic 
production. As Heidegger puts it, 
if we speak of the “essence of a house” and the 
“essence of a state,” we do not mean a generic type; 
rather we mean the ways in which house and state 
hold sway, administer themselves, develop and 
decay—the way in which they “essence” [Wesen].52
If we speak of an essence of digital technology, it 
is not the specific applications, devices, or Internet 
browsers that we address—not the platform which 
LaBeouf might have used to create his works—but 
a broader attitude towards the ways in which we 
engage with the means of information production 
and dissemination in an environment in which all of 
these technologies influence creative practices. 
This is a trajectory that has its roots in what can be 
described as Heidegger’s taxonomy of technology. 
Heidegger draws a distinction between modern 
technology and its traditional equivalent. While, 
for Heidegger, the modern technology restricts 
the definition of the technological to that which 
is purely instrumental, the traditional technology, 
or technē, typically encompasses manifestations of 
skill, art, or craft. Technē is a category used to denote 
both the creative and the instrumental practice; it 
is, Heidegger writes, “the name not only for the 
activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the 
arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs 
to […] poiēsis; it is something poietic.”53 It is in the 
affinities between technē and technology that the 
nature of the essence of technology resides. Technē 
is both technology and poiēsis, technē as a cultural 
technique perhaps, where technology assumes a 
sense of a method of the arts, turning itself into 
an aesthetic tool. It is a matter of a certain orienta-
tion towards technology as a wide-ranging cultural 
attitude. It involves an extensive engagement with 
processes of making and producing and is not a 
manifestation of a singular machine or tool. 
What is of particular significance to my argument 
here is the possibility afforded by thinking about 
technology as essence to explore the dynamic of 
alterity, subversion, and change, implicit in the 
logic of the Iterative Turn. Technē, unlike modern 
technology, is inherently non-instrumental; the 
essence of technology is a matter of constant change. 
As Heidegger argues, the world is set in place 
(gestellt), and the modern technology as a tool and 
a means to an end, is what Heidegger describes as 
an Enframing (Gestell). While Enframing is char-
acterised by an attempt at regulating, securing, 
using technology as a means of setting in place, the 
emphasis of technē is on engaging with technology 
in non-instrumental terms, on unsecuring and 
unsettling the familiar categories and paradigms. 
The use of technology that informs contemporary 
aesthetic practice should be seen as the essence 
of technē rather than of technology per se. The 
engagement with technology that informs iterative 
creative practices can be considered as a response 
to an ever-increasing technological move towards 
Enframing, a response to an effort to regulate the 
arts, to secure the technē in purely instrumental 
terms. The aesthetic premise of iterative creative acts 
stems from, I suggest, the possibilities of thinking 
about technology and creativity as technē, where 
creative process emerges as a result of unsecuring 
and unsettling the familiar, dominant categories. 
While Heidegger sees Enframing as the essence 
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of modern technology, I suggest that turning towards technē, 
with allowances for digital thinking, offers a more accurate 
framework for the contemporary context. As such, the creative 
thinking at the contemporary postproduction moment should 
be seen as governed by the essence of technology (Wessen) rather 
than by its Enframing (Gestell). In this approach, any act of 
digital reproducibility, assumes an aesthetic rather than instru-
mental function. It becomes an end in itself, governed by its 
own logic of iteration rather than by the rules of techno-deter-
ministic pragmatism. The iterative aesthetic, with its subversive 
take on mechanisms of technology, becomes a space where 
the possibilities of technē as a universal creative paradigm are 
recognised and realised. 
Such understanding of the essence of technology as a flexible 
and fluid category, as a cultural state that is coming to 
presence,54 is inscribed into my notion of the Iterative Turn. 
Thinking about the contemporary change in technology 
emerging in the postproduction moment as “a turn” allows for 
an acknowledgement of a certain sense of continuity in con-
ceptualising practices of appropriation in the variety of their 
historical guises, always informed by the essence of technology, 
and changing as a result of shifting conceptions of technology 
in their respective cultural moments. A turn does not imply 
a break away from the older models of technology or creative 
practice—Home’s plagiarism, for example, develops from 
rather than rejects the postmodern and modernist projects—
but as an unsettling process that has generative qualities at 
the same time, as a Heideggerian “turning”. Heidegger speaks 
of a turning as that which comes to pass within Enframing. 
As Heidegger writes, “if a change in Being—i.e., now, in the 
coming to presence of Enframing—comes to pass, than this in 
no way means that technology […] will be done away with.”55 A 
change in the coming to presence of a new aesthetic paradigm 
in no way means that earlier creative models will be done away 
with. Rather, the coming to presence of a new conception 
of technology is characteristically driven by what Heidegger 
describes as the “change of its destining”.56 The change, as a 
turn, or turning, manifests itself “out of the arrival of another 
destining”.57 A change in the Enframing, in the technological 
apparatus, a development of new technological possibilities, 
i.e. the ubiquity of the digital tools and methods, results in 
a turning not just in the technology itself, but in the essence 
of technology, in its conception and the attitudes towards an 
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altered technological reality that emerge as a result. 
In the turning, “everything is reversed”, but never-
theless it is “not a change of standpoint”.58 Rather, 
it is a change conceived of as a turning point59 
that allows for a shift in established paradigms 
in response to the change in the conception of 
technology. The turning, then, emerges from a 
pattern of discontinuities with what comes before 
it—appropriating in postproduction moment differs 
from the related modernist and postmodern acts—
but the conception of technology and the related 
aesthetic that emerge as a result of the turning are 
interpretable from within and through a relationship 
to earlier projects and concerns. 
Hence, what is manifested in the contemporary 
postproduction turn towards digital technology 
and iteration is a transformation in the attitudes 
towards forms of knowing (and technē, as Heidegger 
explained, is linked with the word epistēmē—“both 
words are names for knowing in the widest sense”).60 
“Such knowing”, Heidegger suggests, “provides 
an opening up. As an opening up it is revealing”,61 
indicative of epistemologies of contemporary 
aesthetics, revealing shifting paradigms of creative 
thinking and alternative approaches to originality 
that emerge at the backdrop of such a conceptual 
framework. For Heidegger, technology is a way 
of revealing (das Entreben) of that which it brings 
forth, i.e. letting a thing disclose itself rather than 
simply producing or manufacturing an object in 
purely instrumental terms. ‘”What is instrumental 
in technē”, Heidegger writes, “does not lie at all in 
making and manipulating nor in the using of means, 
but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as 
revealing, and not as manufacturing that technē is 
bringing forth.”62 Creative acts such as LaBeouf ’s, 
overtly reliant on repurposed material, are a mani-
festation of such an assumption, openly disclosing 
themselves, their methods and sources to draw 
attention to their distinctive aesthetics, to alterna-
tive models of thinking about creativity today. It is 
not the manipulation of sources, making by means 
of remaking, that is at the core of iterative creative 
work, but rather the revealing of the making as 
remaking. Conceptualised as such, contemporary 
uncreative works should not be considered instances 
of plagiarism or copyright infringement but are 
better described as iterative acts and an expression 
of the contemporary Iterative Turn. Iteration as it 
manifests itself at the postproduction moment can 
be seen as an expression of what Bourriaud describes 
as a “configuration of knowledge, which is charac-
terised by the invention of paths through culture.”63 
Here Heideggerian thinking and Bourriaud’s project 
converge to form a notion of an Iterative Turn that 
is indicative of shifting aesthetic attitudes and 
emergent means of conceptualising them. 
Understood as such, the notion of iteration serves 
as a broad and flexible concept akin to, or perhaps 
itself a manifestation of, the Heideggerian essence, 
an essence of making by means of transgressing the 
familiar notions of authorship and creativity that 
turns into a creative act, one that is revealing of 
the paradigms of creativity constructed by iterative 
means. Hence, iteration should be considered as 
a category particularly relevant to describing the 
dynamic of technological and aesthetic turns, 
where a change, a shift in tools, practices, and 
attitudes, involves both a move away from the earlier 
paradigms and a repetition of the earlier paradigms 
at the same time.64 Hence, each turn, regardless 
of the cultural condition that defines it, is always 
an iterative process, repeating and altering earlier 
aesthetic models and systems of thought in a chain 
of constant change of charged differences.
The contemporary turn should be seen, I suggest, 
as iterative in such a broad sense. It should be 
understood as evocative of the modernist and 
postmodernist commitment to repetition associated 
with a certain propensity for technological change 
as an aesthetic dominant. At the same time, this 
current Iterative Turn is a turn towards iteration as 
a creative method and form that defines the cultural 
and aesthetic dynamics today. As a response to the 
postproduction condition, iteration, or the essence of 
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iteration, perhaps—a general attitude towards  
re-appropriating earlier paradigms of aesthetic thinking 
for a cultural moment—translates into specific forms 
of expression that assume repetition as a model of 
creativity. Here the principles of an iterative turn in 
general, and of a turn towards iteration triggered by the 
current cultural moment converge at the Iterative Turn. 
In Heideggerian terms, the contemporary Iterative Turn 
combines an essence of iteration and an Enframing of 
iteration at the same time, or, as Derrida would have it, 
an example of iteration in general—a condition of iter-
ability—and a singular iteration in itself. Seen as such, 
iteration should be considered both a method of creative 
practice and a historical category of aesthetics. The 
contemporary turn emerges as a result of a conflation of 
the two models, always intertwined in the contemporary 
iterative thinking, where the condition of iterability as 
an attitude to creative practice, finds its momentum and 
a manifestation in related iterative forms. Seen as such, 
iterability turns into a law of not only repetition itself 
but of postproduction creativity more broadly. While 
the possibility of a repetition of a particular creative 
form or mode of expression is always a probability, it is 
the specific context of the postproduction moment that 
creates a condition for the Iterative Turn to manifest 
itself most explicitly. That is to say, iteration as a creative 
paradigm reveals itself in the mode of revealing that is 
most suited to it. 
At the Iterative Turn, the function of reproduction 
technologies is not simply a matter of technological 
reproducibility as a means to an end, but rather an end 
in itself. At the Iterative Turn, an act appropriating 
already authored content turns into an expression of 
iterative thinking. Today, it is not simply an aestheti-
cisation of technology or technologisation of aesthetics 
that are at stake. The ubiquity of contemporary digi-
talisation means that distinctions between the tech-
nological in the instrumental sense and the digital 
aesthetics are increasingly impossible to draw, with 
digital technology assuming a role of all-encompassing 
digital culture. It is in such a context that the Iterative 
Turn emerges, a moment in which both technology 
and aesthetics are at a turning point, turning away 
58. Heidegger, Martin. Letter on Humanism. In Martin Heidegger: Basic 
Writings. Trans. F.A Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray. D.F. Krell (ed.). Lon-
don: Routledge. 1993. pp. 231-232.
 
59. My description of change as a turning point is a reference to Hei-
degger’s statement in his letter to William J. Richardson which, in the 
German original, reads: “Das Denken der Kehre ist eine Wendung in 
meinem Denken.” The notion of “die Kehre” mentioned here has been 
varyingly translated as ‘a turn,’ ‘a turning,’ or ‘a reversal,’ and the state-
ment itself has been translated with references to a ‘turning point’ and 
‘change.’” William J. Richardson translates the statement as: “The think-
ing of the reversal is a change in my thought.” Reprinted as Preface to 
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. William J. Richardson. New 
York, NY: Fordham University Press. 2003. p. xviii. In contrast, Emad 
Parvis’s translation reads: “The thinking of the turning is a turning point 
in my thinking.” In On the Way to Heidegger’s Contribution to Philosophy. 
Emad Parvis. Maddison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 2007. p. 
111. See note 41, p. 214 on Parvis’s comment on his translation.
 
60. Heidegger, The Question, p. 5. 
 
61. Ibid.
 
62. Ibid., p. 6. 
 
63. Bourriaud, p. 19. 
 
64. The same iterative logic is implied in my conflation of Heidegger and 
Derrida’s terms and the relationship between Heidegger and Derrida’s 
thought. Derrida’s could be described as an iteration of Heidegger’s phi-
losophy, as its altered repetition. This association with Heidegger is one 
that Derrida makes explicit himself. See Jacques Derrida. Positions. Trans. 
Alan Bass. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 1981. pp. 52-54.  
Derrida’s wider philosophical project is, in fact, an iterative one. It is 
governed by what Spivak describes as “the notion of the joyful yet labori-
ous strategy of rewriting the old language […] Derrida acknowledges that 
the desire of deconstruction may itself become a desire to reappropri-
ate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it ‘does not 
know’.” See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Translator’s Preface to Jacques 
Derrida. Of Grammatology. Baltimore, MD, and London: The John Hop-
kins University Press. 1997. pp. xx, lxxvii. Derrida’s work is within and 
without the work of Heidegger, and his other predecessors more broadly; 
it repeats it by means of alterity, it reverses it without rejecting it, offering 
a framework particularly useful for thinking about the Iterative Turn and 
my attempt to question the familiar terms of creativity, originality, and 
authorship. 
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from earlier paradigms without rejecting them, 
and turning into one another as technē. Here, the 
process of digital reproduction loses its instrumen-
tal, purely functional associations, to assume its 
own all-pervasive iterative logic. This is not to say 
the Iterative Turn permits or favours plagiarism and 
copyright infringement. It does not offer a context 
for a defence or indictment of either, or of projects 
such as LaBeouf ’s. Instead, it draws attention to the 
changing conditions of cultural production, where 
questions of the aura65 are no longer a creative 
concern. The iterative project offers means of recon-
ceptualising attitudes towards technology and, as a 
result, transforms the “danger” that acts of copying 
typically pose to creativity into a form of liberation 
from it, a “saving power”,66 transforming plagiarism 
into iteration, copying into a paradigm of creativity 
itself.
65. I refer here to Walter Benjamin’s notion of the “aura”. The aura is an aes-
thetic category, a way of describing particular qualities of art that Benjamin saw 
waning in modernity as a result of increasing mechanisation of society. The aura 
of a work connotes its singularity and qualities such as authority, authenticity, 
and originality grounded explicitly in the Romantic understanding of creativity. 
As Benjamin argues, the aura disappears in the modern age, as a result of the 
possibilities of reproducibility that proliferate. Benjamin associates the notion 
of originality with an artwork’s unique presence in space and time and argues 
that a reproduced piece loses the quality of originality exactly because it is 
always removed from the auratic original, because in reproduction the origin is 
always absent, and so the work loses the quality of originality, authenticity, and 
authority. Benjamin writes: “the presence of the original is the prerequisite to 
the concept of authenticity.” Benjamin, p. 214. 
 
66. This statement is a reference to Heidegger’s notions of danger and saving 
power. Heidegger understands modern technology as danger, danger to man, 
danger to Being, technology in its instrumental sense, as Enframing, “endan-
gers the relationship to the essence of truth”. See Heidegger, The Question, p. 
33. Enframing, Heidegger explains, “banishes man into that kind of revealing 
that is ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other 
possibility of revealing. Above all, Enframing conceals that revealing which, 
in the sense of poiēsis, lets what presences come forth into appearance.” (p. 27) 
But, for Heidegger, the danger always harbours the possibility of transforma-
tion, of a turn, there is a possibility of liberation in every danger. Heidegger 
writes: “where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense. But 
where danger is, grows/The saving power also.” (p. 28) In line with Heidegger’s 
argument, acts of copying emerge as antithetical to paradigms of creativity and 
as inherently creative acts at the same time. Copying assumes creative qualities 
exactly because it is dismissed as “danger”, by law, by publishing standards, by 
prevailing notions of creativity and authorship. 
